STRENGTHENING DEFENCE SECURITY OF SUPPLY FOR 2030 DEFENCE READINESS

EDA Steering Board | Joint Statement | 17 November 2026

We, the defence ministers of the EU,

A. Recall the conclusions of the European Council of 18-19 June 2026 in which EU Heads of State and Government stressed inter alia that "Europe's defence readiness must be decisively ramped up by 2030";

B. Reaffirm, that the defence industry is foundational to defence readiness and that a further ramping up of defence industry production is required to achieving defence readiness 2030 objectives, as underlined by EDA's 2026 "Annual Report on Defence Readiness";

C. Note that the role of the Union in defence security of supply is to complement and support the national efforts of the Member States, especially to address shared vulnerabilities and strengthen Europe's collective resilience;

D. Recall the "Framework Arrangement on Security of Supply between Subscribing Member States", adopted by the EDA Steering Board in Ministers of Defence composition on 19 November 2013, in which the subscribing Member States agreed to assist and expedite each other's contracted defence security of supply requirements;

E. Recall the declaration by the Representatives of the Governments of EDA participating Member States of 19 June 2017 on the "Member States' Political Commitment on Security of Supply", which encourages mutual support on requests for security of supply support regarding critical supplies and services for defence, and facilitating and expediting defence transfers and/or transits, throughout the life cycle of defence capability;

F. Recall the Versailles declaration of 11 March 2022 of EU Heads of State and Government, which highlighted *inter alia* the need to reduce the Union's strategic dependencies in the areas of critical raw materials, semi-conductors, health, digital, and food;

G. Recall that Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 ('Critical Raw Materials Act'), does not feature defence-specific provisions;

H. Recall Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2025 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products ('EDIP Regulation'), which *inter alia* establishes a Security of Supply regime for the Union to map, monitor, and respond to security-related supply crises;

I. Recall the conclusions of the European Council of 19 March 2026 and 18-19 June 2026 in which EU Heads of State and Government highlighted *inter alia* the need to "reduce strategic dependencies and address critical capability gaps, with a 360° approach";

J. Accordingly, we endorse the following joint statement.

Undesired dependencies are a growing vulnerability for European defence

1. Achieving the European defence readiness 2030 objective set out by EU Heads of State and Government depends on resilient and agile supply chains. Yet, the EU remains dependent on non-European suppliers for many critical raw materials, chemicals, and components, the availability of which is increasingly determining the pace of capability delivery. While such dependencies are a common feature of global supply chains, reducing undesired dependencies that may affect security of supply is essential to ensuring defence readiness.
2. The increasing weaponisation of trade dependencies by some third countries through export restrictions has also demonstrated the fragility of EU defence supply chains. While such challenges affect civilian and defence-related supply chains alike, their consequences are particularly acute in the defence sector, where disruptions can become security challenges.

Reducing undesired dependencies requires concerted action

3. The EDTIB's defence production and capability delivery is increasingly supported by several civilian EU policy instruments. To ensure coherence, the relevant civilian Union policies should systematically take defence requirements into account and, in situations of supply constraints, ensure that essential defence needs are adequately safeguarded and supported.
4. Reflecting defence requirements across the relevant Union policies also requires greater coordination among already established and any future governance bodies and networks supporting the implementation of these policies, both at the intergovernmental and supranational level.
5. As defence policy remains primarily a Member State prerogative, the national security of supply efforts of Member States should be complemented by stronger intergovernmental cooperation and mutual support to address shared vulnerabilities.
6. A stronger security of supply-focused policy framework at EU level must be matched by action from industry. Hence, EDTIB-based entities and their suppliers should assess and mitigate their exposure to supply chain risks, including through supplier diversification, appropriate redundancy, strategic stockpiling where necessary, and investment in substitutes where technically and economically viable.
7. Reliable and predictable access to finance also continues to remain an important enabler of defence-industrial resilience. Hence, greater predictability and visibility regarding future funding priorities and support measures, and their implementation by both public and private institutions, are essential to provide industry with the confidence needed to invest in strategic segments of the supply chain.

Considering the above, we, the defence ministers of the EU,

8. Emphasise that security of supply is a prerequisite for Defence Readiness 2030 and that undesired dependencies affecting the supply of defence-relevant critical raw materials, chemicals and components constrain the ability of Member States to procure, sustain and replenish their capabilities and operations;
9. Call for ensuring that EU-level policies on security of supply, including those relating to critical raw materials, semiconductors and chemicals, systematically reflect defence requirements; stress that, where access to critical materials or components is constrained, appropriate mechanisms should ensure that defence needs are prioritised;
10. Call for ensuring that governance bodies established under defence-relevant Union initiatives work in a coherent and mutually reinforcing manner towards the common objective of defence security of supply, while avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts;
11. Underline that bodies established under EDIP, the Critical Raw Materials Act, the European Chips Act and related initiatives each address different, but interconnected, segments of the value chain, and that defence readiness depends on their collective contribution, rather than on isolated sectoral actions. Furthermore, this collective contribution should be aligned with defence requirements and translated into coordinated actions across the value chain;
12. Call on EDTIB-based entities to strengthen defence security of supply by increasingly sourcing from suppliers in the EU and trusted partner countries, diversifying sources of supply, and, where appropriate, putting in place strategic stockpiles, establishing new industry-to-industry strategic partnerships, and investing in substitute technologies and materials;
13. Stress that ensuring security of supply requires sustained investment across the entire EDTIB and call for both defence and non-defence Union funding instruments to contribute to this objective by providing greater predictability and visibility of funding priorities and funding flows over time, and prioritising funding for supply chain resilience and agility, particularly where commercial incentives are insufficient to attract private investment;
14. Stress that the Union's financial and legislative framework, including the forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework, should reflect the urgency of strengthening defence security of supply as set out in this statement;
15. Instruct EDA to continue and reinforce its support to Member States on security of supply, in particular by facilitating the identification and consolidation of defence-related requirements, dependencies and priorities, and their consideration in relevant Union initiatives to identify opportunities and gaps where such initiatives can contribute to defence security of supply;
16. Instruct EDA to continue facilitating the coordination of national initiatives and supporting intergovernmental cooperation, including through its Security of Supply Network, and report back to the Steering Board.