Increased defence cooperation among Europeans is becoming urgent

What is your general view on how European defence cooperation has evolved over the past decade and a half, and particularly since the 2016 EU Global Strategy?

The  launch  of  the  Global  Strategy  in  2016  created a tremendous opportunity. We have since  been  witnessing  the  emergence  of  a  brand-new  environment  that  will  deeply  change  the  perception  and  interactions  of  the  defence  industry.  Although  these  initiatives  are  still  in  their  infancy  and  budgets  are  limited,  we  can  already  see  a  ripple  effect  with  an  extremely  significant  mobilisation among industries and governments;  as  if  the  entire  European  defence  community  had  grasped  the  importance  of  those  initiatives  and  is  now  looking at them with a lot of attention. It seems that everyone is now understanding and  agreeing  with  this  objective  of  the  2016 EU Global Strategy: “A sustainable, innovative  and  competitive  European  defence  industry  is  essential  for  Europe’s  strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP.” As  you  know,  MBDA  is  a  truly  European  company  and  it  is  quite  pleasant  to  see,  today,  a  general  adhesion  to  the  principles  that led to our creation in 2001.

And your overall assessment of the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) role in that development? 

EDA is playing a key role in the development of  defence  cooperation.  Due  to  its  unique  nature,  defence  policy  will  remain  the  political responsibility of the Member States. The  end  purpose  of  the  new  European  defence  agenda  and  of  the  mobilisation  of  EU  funding  is  to  support  the  development  of  the  military  capabilities  Member  States’  armed  forces  need  to  perform  their  operational duties. The intergovernmental dimension of this agenda remains therefore pivotal.  In  this  context,  EDA  is  the  forum  of  choice  for  Member  States  to  help  prioritise  the operational needs and technologies that need  to  be  dealt  with  at  European  level.  As  the  secretariat  of  the  PESCO  initiative,  EDA  is also evaluating the European added value of  the  PESCO  capability  projects  and  the  implementation by the Member States of the PESCO  binding  commitments,  in  particular  the  ones  related  to  the  procurement  strategies and their impact on the European defence technological and industrial base, which  are  of  particular  importance  for  industry.  Last  but  not  least,  through  its  12  Capability  Technology  Areas  (CapTechs)  and  networks  of  industry  and  government  experts,  EDA  is  acting  as  a  catalyst  for  more R&T collaboration between European stakeholders.

A competitive defence industry is a prerequisite for a strong European defence, let alone for achieving strategic autonomy. What is needed to bring our industry to that level?

European  nations  undoubtedly  have  world-class  defence  industries,  but  in  the  current  geostrategic  environment  characterised  by  uncertainties  and  the  rise  of  regional  powers,  increased  defence  and  security  cooperation between European nations is becoming urgent. I identify two key priorities. First, the development and strengthening of the European technological base in order to ensure security of supply for European armed  forces,  which  will  lead  to  increased  freedom  of  action  and  autonomy  for  our  nations  when  they  need  to  protect  their  interests. Second, the ability for the industry to  be  proactive  and  anticipate  the  future  needs  of  European  actors  with  innovative  solutions.  Today,  European  countries  are  committing  themselves  to  the  principle  of  cooperation  as  well  as  to  the  concept  of  a  genuine  European  industrial  base  in  the  defence sector, in particular through PESCO. Our role, as industry, is to make sure we can offer  the  best  solution  for  every  specified  requirement,  either  by  proposing  new  concepts  or  by  mutualising  the  solutions  with the aim to cut costs. 

Artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous systems, etc.: new disruptive technologies are revolutionising the defence sector.  Can European suppliers – including MBDA – compete in these domains? If not, what does this mean for EU strategic autonomy?  

We  certainly  can  compete  and  already  are.  In  order  to  secure  its  leading  position,  MBDA  is  investing  a  lot  in  specific  R&T  and  R&D.  As  an  example,  we  are  already  introducing  decision aid functions in our missile systems to  help  the  operator  identify  the  target  and  optimise  the  engagement  timing.  Just  a  few  weeks  ago,  we  inaugurated  our  new  data  centre  that  will  extend  the  speed  domain  of  our  simulations  into  hypersonics  in  order  to  validate  and  develop  an  even  broader  set  of  missile capabilities. MBDA is certainly among the  few  European  defence  industries  that  have  access  to  the  largest  possible  network  of  researchers  and  startups  thanks  to  its  multinational base.

However,  when  it  comes  to  AI  and  deep  learning,  sharing  of  data  for  machine  learning  between  the  member  nations  should be encouraged as it would help Europe  have  access  to  databases  of  sizes  similar  to  those  of  the  USA,  China  or  Russia  in  order  to  better  train  our  algorithms.  As  those  algorithms  require  huge  computing  power,  another  key  sovereign  technology  Europe  needs  to  master  certainly  is  the  new generation of low power consumption Massively Parallel Processors (MPP) if it wants  to  avoid  critical  dependencies  in  the  future.  These  are  two  examples  of  the  challenges  that  Europe  has  to  face  when  it  wants  to  sustain  its  strategic  autonomy  for  the future.

How do you assess the EU’s new defence initiatives (CARD, PESCO, EDF)? What difference can they make to improve industry’s competitiveness?

The EU’s new defence initiatives are in fact the three  core  elements  of  the  same  European  defence  dynamic.  Each  of  these  initiatives  has  its  own  added  value.  Their  strength  lies  in  their  comprehensive  articulation  in  order  to generate new collaborative programmes, which  is  even  more  challenging  in  today’s  European  political  landscape.  The  defence  industry  has  now  a  solid  opportunity  to  benefit  from  a  coherent  process  at  EU  level,  starting  with  the  identification  of  European  capability development priorities (CDP/CARD),  then  the  possibility  to  address  these  priorities between voluntary Member States within  a  permanent  and  binding  framework  (PESCO), and finally the contribution of the EU budget  through  the  European  Defence  Fund  to implement these capabilities.

The  ‘European  Beyond  Line  Of  Sight’  (BLOS)  capability  approach  in  the  land  battlefield  missile systems domain is the first concrete example  in  our  sector.  The  ground  combat  capability  is  identified  as  one  of  the  eleven  capability priorities as part of the revised CDP. In  this  context,  France,  Belgium  and  Cyprus  launched last year a PESCO capability project highlighting a new operational differentiating capability  in  this  field,  which  provides  the  necessary  high  degree  of  accuracy  and  efficiency  while  avoiding  widespread  collateral damage and reducing the exposure of  friendly  forces.  The  testing  of  a  mounted  BLOS  capability  with  a  stand-alone  target  designation  will  in  the  end  benefit  from  EU  funding  support  through  the  EU  Defence  Industrial  Development  Programme  (EDIDP).  As  the  European  champion  in  missile  systems,  we  fully  support  and  actively  contribute  to  this  European  approach  with  the  objective  to  sustain  it  in  the  long  term  and  to  replicate  it  in  the  near  future  in  other  missile systems domains.

What is your assessment of the EU’s Preparatory Action on Defence Research and the prospects of a future European Defence Research Programme?

From  an  industrial  perspective,  the  new  funding  opportunities  at  EU  level  have  three  main  merits.  Firstly,  they  are  a  real  incentive  to  generate  new  European  collaborative activities by complementing national  funding  on  topics  with  a  clear  European  added  value  and  by  accelerating  the  launch  of  new  programmes.  Secondly,  these  instruments  give  substance  to  the  objective of strategic autonomy, which would  otherwise  remain  theoretical.  Thanks  to  the  EU  institutions,  they  also  only  support  genuine  European  industries  and technologies without non-EU restrictions or control. A European design authority  is  indeed  the  sole  mean  to  guarantee  an  effective  security  of  supply  and  a  technological  mastery,  two  critical  conditions to achieve freedom of action on the  battlefield.  Thirdly,  they  offer  concrete  opportunities of cooperation between European  stakeholders  at  industrial  and  technological  levels.  Keeping  in  mind  the  technological  excellence  and  industrial  performance  requirements,  they  represent  a  real  possibility  to  find  new  partners,  enlarge  our  supply  chain  network  and,  in  some cases, resolve existing dependencies towards non-European solutions. Due to its European DNA, MBDA can only be proactive, as  a  leader  or  as  a  contributor,  to  these  European initiatives.

What are MBDA’s defence innovation and development priorities for the coming years? 

MBDA is a truly European company and I will therefore mention those programmes that are led in cooperation and demonstrate our added  value.  This  is  the  case  of  the  Anglo-French  FC/ASW  (Future  Cruise/Anti-Ship  Weapon)  that  is  intended  to  replace  the  whole  portfolio  of  deep  strike  and  heavy  anti-ship  missiles  currently  operated  by  France  and  the  UK  (SCALP/Storm  Shadow,  Exocet and Harpoon) with a step change in operational  capabilities.  This  programme  is  into  the  second  year  of  its  concept  phase  and  we  would  like  to  see  more  European  nations  joining  before  the  full-scale  development is launched in 2024.

We  are  involved  in  the  Future  Combat  Air  System  (FCAS),  a  French-German  and  now  Spanish programme and in the British Team Tempest  with  the  aim,  in  those  very  early  steps, to define the best trade-off between platforms and effectors that will lead to an optimised  system.  MBDA  is  very  proud  to  contribute  with  the  MMP  potentialities  to  the  EU  Beyond  Line  Of  Sight  PESCO  project  that  will  allow  European  nations  to  share  operational concepts and doctrines on this brand  new  battlefield  combat  capability,  based  on  technologies  that  are  fully  mastered and owned in Europe with no risk of control nor restriction from abroad.

We  are  also  pursuing  internal  concept  studies on what could be a follow-on to the Aster extended air defence interceptor that equips  French,  Italian  and  British  forces  and  six  other  countries  outside  Europe.  We consider that a protection against the  emerging  threats  of  manoeuvring  ballistic  and  hypersonic  cruise  missiles  is  a  capability  that  would  bring  significant  strategic autonomy to Europe and that could  be  a  good  candidate  for  being  led  within the PESCO framework.

MBDA was created in 2001 after the merger of missile systems companies from France, Italy and the UK, later followed by manufacturers from Germany and Spain. Will it further expand in the future to become an even bigger European champion? 

To consolidate its stature of European champion  is  a  natural  aim  for  a  company  such  as  MBDA...  Does  it  necessarily  take  new  mergers?  I  am  not  so  sure.  As  we  already  discussed,  the  ongoing  European  defence agenda is already offering multiple new collaboration opportunities within  the  European  defence  community.

Obviously,  we  are  eager  to  be  part  of  it.  MBDA  will  always  share  support,  ideas  and  expertise  with  other  countries  and  be  looking  for  other  partners.  Through  PESCO,  collaborative  programmes  or  other  frameworks  is,  for  now,  how  we  intend  to  grow  and  better  serve  the  strategic  autonomy  of  our  nations  and  of  the  EU  as  a whole.

What impact do you expect Brexit to have on European defence? Politically, but also for Europe’s defence industry and future collaborative projects? 

In  the  field  of  defence,  the  UK  cannot  be  treated  after  Brexit  in  the  same  manner  as  any  other  third  country.  The  UK  clearly  shares  European  values  and  interests  and  is among the nations who have historically contributed  the  most  to  cooperation  in  Europe,  through  programmes  such  as  Tornado, Typhoon, A400M and Meteor. More recently,  the  decision  to  join  the  European  Intervention  Initiative  is  a  further  example  of  the  UK’s  commitment  to  European  defence  and  I  can  see  this  has  been  recently  recognised  by  the  highest  French  and German political leaders who called for a European Security Council to which the UK should be associated.

It  will  therefore  be  essential  after  Brexit  to  maintain  access  for  the  UK,  under  conditions  to  be  negotiated,  to  the  instruments  of  the  EU  defence  policy;  whether  it  is  the  European  Defence  Agency,  PESCO  or  the  European  Defence  Fund.  It  is  indeed  in  the  interest  of  both  the  EU  and  the  UK  to  continue  sustaining  together their industries that have for long worked together and created mutual dependencies. This is the condition to keep a critical mass and competitiveness for the European industry as a whole.