Cooperation pioneers, innovators, facilitators

Mr Witney, you surely remember 30 July 2004 when you were appointed first CE of the European Defence Agency (EDA). What was your dominant feeling on that day?

N.Witney: I predominantly felt a sense of relief that the decision had been formalised before the summer break because there was so much to be done and no time to waste. You have to recall that the whole establishment process of the Agency took place under enormous time pressure. The Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 had decided that the Agency was to be created “in the course of 2004”. The autumn of 2003 was lost to a false start; and when I was called to Brussels in January 2004, I barely had three months to set up the Establishment Team and develop a plan. This led on to the creation of the Agency as a legal entity in June (the Irish Presidency were brilliant on this) – leaving a scant half year to achieve first operational status by the year-end, to meet the Thessaloniki deadline.

Which were the main difficulties in getting the Agency fully up and running?

N.Witney: There was a lot to be done in terms of recruitment, to start with. This was more complicated than I expected: naively, I was taken aback at the determination of a number of capitals to secure particular posts for their own nationals, sometimes for wholly unsuitable individuals. But we ended up with a top team whom I was more than happy with, and they then recruited their immediate support. So by year-end we had some 25 staff in place, and had been able to sort out work programmes and agendas for the year ahead. We were also engaged in the search for offices, and then the IT and security work to convert the Rue des Drapiers into our new home. 

Which were the first priorities you started with?

N.Witney: First of all, we spent quite some time on getting people intellectually on the same page, debating policies and strategies and trying to persuade Member States on what we felt was necessary: the imperative to increase cooperation and modernise capabilities, away from heavy metal and high explosive to a greater emphasis on the new technologies of “network-centric warfare”; reducing spend on excessive manpower, and increasing it on research and development; fostering a stronger defence technological and industrial base through consolidation on both demand and supply sides, and a more open internal defence equipment market.

At the same time, we wanted to have a few demonstrative projects to start with. We looked into armed fighting vehicles and Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) and also started a lot of research collaborations, for instance on software-defined radio. Another project we focused on was the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, which was approved in November 2005 (a voluntary approach to increasing cross-border purchasing, which worked rather well before the Commission decided to legislate), and a first Joint Investment Programme on research dealing with soldier protection. From time to time, we would also throw in new ideas. One of them, I remember, was to investigate a European coastguard. ‘A coastguard? That’s ridiculous!’, was the overall reaction. Fifteen years on, it doesn’t sound ridiculous anymore!

Was the newly born agency immediately taken seriously by national MoDs?

N.Witney: Yes and no. I was very fortunate to be there at a time when the general mood and political momentum were very positive and pro-EU. Europe was so fashionable and popular. EDA and defence cooperation were new projects and everyone wanted to be part of them! It was also the time of enlargement, and all the new members were so enthusiastic. All this played in our favour. It was only over time that I realised the extent of resistance and inertia in the machinery: it was hugely difficult to get the Ministries of Defence actually to change the way they spend their money.

You mean resistance from the military?

N.Witney: Yes, definitely. If there was one group of stakeholders who were not supportive to EDA at the outset, it was the military. This came to me as a big surprise. I think the reality was that, as professional men, they were much more comfortable working with the Americans in NATO, and viewed European defence with some skepticism; crisis-management operations were seldom greeted with enthusiasm. But perhaps I was unrealistic in my expectations of how rapidly a complex culture could change.

During the mandate of Alexander Weis, one of the highlights was the first Capability Development Plan (CDP) drawn up in 2008. Did it lay the groundwork for today’s joint planning and prioritisation?

J.Domecq: Yes, absolutely. But the CDP has strongly evolved since then. The first three versions of 2008, 2011 and 2014 cannot be compared to the 2018 plan which, for the first time, has now been recognised by Member States as the baseline reference for all European efforts in that domain. For a long time, MoDs had viewed the CDP as a nice tool to have but they only remembered it once every few years when it had to be reviewed. In between, they didn’t take it into account when drafting their national plans. That has changed. Today’s baseline CDP is a result of EDA’s work throughout the years.

Madame Arnould, under your tenure, EDA gained traction with the ‘Pooling & Sharing’ concept which guided its work for years.

C.-F.Arnould: ‘Pooling & Sharing’ was a concept which provided much political impetus for EDA’s subsequent work. The objective was broadly and simply to be more efficient by acting together. Then came the question: should the Pooling & Sharing initiative be hosted by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) or by EDA? I had very pragmatic discussions with the Chairman of the Military Committee at the time, General Håkan Syrén, and we agreed that we should support each other. And, obviously to provide substance, synergy between the capability, the procurement and the R&T actors, and connection between the expert level and the political level, namely Defence Ministers, EDA is the place to go. The EUMC was important to involve the Chiefs of Defence (CHODS) and take into account, thanks to the work of the EUMS, the lessons of EU operations.

Nevertheless, in some corners, Pooling & Sharing and, thus, our work in EDA, were perceived as threatening defence budgets. Therefore, we had to be very careful not to give our stakeholders the impression that the objective was “to do more with less”. We constantly had to reassure them that EDA was there to support them to do things better together, not to cut their spending. We not only needed more defence cooperation but also more defence spending. We all agreed that to pool and share, you need proper capabilities to pool and share.

In December 2013, the European Council held a first debate on defence and identified priority actions for stronger cooperation. How big a political impetus was this for EDA’s work?

C.-F.Arnould: It was essential. We had always tried to persuade the Heads of State and Government to address defence cooperation. Not in vague strategic terms but linked to the main topics that dominated their agenda: economic growth, job creation, innovation, etc. Herman Van Rompuy, as President of the European Council, agreed that this approach was the best way to ensure the leaders’ interest for defence and their commitment. We worked with the President’s very pragmatic and efficient cabinet, with the Commission, with the Secretariat of the Council and, together, provided input for the debate on those issues which went well, even if some important ideas such as a financial mechanism largely disappeared. At the same time, a strong incentive was provided by the decision taken by the Belgian authorities to provide VAT exoneration for programmes conducted in EDA.

Did it have an immediate impact on EDA’s work?

C.-F.Arnould: Yes, of course. We chose four projects which were fully supported by Member States: air-to-air refueling, remotely piloted aircraft systems, governmental satellite communications and cyber. These were topics on which everybody wanted to see action and results. Industry was also involved, which was crucial.

N.Witney: A key aspect of the December 2013 conclusions was that they set deadlines, meaning that project leaders were required to come back to the European Council within 18 months and brief on progress. But the tragedy was that it actually didn’t happen because, somehow, the ball was dropped afterwards...

J.Domecq: We should not forget that in 2014/2015, things changed drastically and new security threats, such as terrorism, arose in and around Europe. All of that made citizens and governments think: shouldn’t we cooperate more and better to protect our citizens? This new context led to the 2016 EU Global Strategy which set the tone for a much more ambitious security and defence agenda.

Mr Domecq, you arrived at the Agency at that particular moment, in 2015.

J.Domecq: Indeed. And the first thing that struck me was the continuous questioning by Member States of the tasks they previously had given to the Agency. And while we mostly managed to deliver on those tasks, Member States very often got cold feet and backtracked... But as time went on, they increasingly understood that there is only one place where they can get all the different military viewpoints – from armament to capability & planning directors, from research to defence policy directors – reflected in one single platform. And that is EDA.

Your mandate so far is marked by the setting-up of new EU tools (CARD, PESCO, EDF) all of which EDA is involved in. Is this a true water-shed moment for the Agency?

J.Domecq: Well, I would argue that EDA has gone from one water-shed moment to another since its creation. The Agency’s life is as challenging as are the efforts to have a more efficient European defence. Both go hand in hand. I think that the future of the Agency will be very much tied to the success of PESCO. It’s two sides of a same coin, and it’s not by chance that the Treaty put us together.

Going forward, it is important that Member States have a clear view on what EDA should concentrate on. That’s why the Agency’s 2017 Long Term Review (LTR) was so important. It reinforced EDA as a real planning and prioritisation instrument, which it was not before. It also confirmed the Agency as the natural European hub for collaborative defence capability and technology development. And EDA’s third key mission is to ensure that EU policies take into account what our Armed Forces need.

The strategic discussion we had during the LTR with Ministers’ sherpas was essential to define and strengthen the Agency’s missions and to prepare it for the roles it is now playing in CARD, PESCO and the EDF. Now that the European Commission has jumped into the defence realm, we needed to have a clear vision from Member States on where they want EDA to be placed on the new defence map.

Is EDA now well enough equipped for the future, or do you see the need for further adjustments?

J.Domecq: We continue to evolve. Member States have to understand that if they don’t reflect at home the collaborative efforts done at EU level – for instance if they ignore the European capability development priorities when setting up their national defence plans – then EDA will become a mere bureaucratic householder. This would mean that Member States don’t take seriously the support work we do for them. That is the first big challenge I see for the Agency.

The second challenge is to make sure EDA has the right resources, especially human resources. We are all fishing in the same pond: we, the Agency, but also the national administrations which have huge staffing needs, especially since defence budgets are rising again. NATO is also having staff increases. Plus of course the Commission which will have to attract defence experts in the future. How can we handle this challenge? On the European side, we should try to avoid duplication of structures.

The third challenge will be to maintain EDA as a hub where it is interesting for industry to engage in for the development of new innovative and disruptive technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence, which will change the way warfare is conducted in the future.

What is your personal assessment of the way EDA’s relationship with NATO has evolved over years?

N.Witney: Things have changed considerably. When I arrived, there were desperate political problems around the relationship between the EU’s CSDP and NATO. Therefore, my first concern was not so much to seek cooperation but rather to deconflict the situation with NATO. When NATO decided to take up one particular topic to improve collective defence, we would focus on something else. To not obstruct each other, that was probably the best we could hope for at that time.

C.-F.Arnould: During my time, we had to demonstrate that we work well with NATO. I was happy to find efficient and cooperative partners on their side. The work with the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was excellent, in particular to deconflict activities under Pooling & Sharing and “Smart Defence” that the NATO Secretary General promoted soon afterwards.

I also would like to mention a topic on which cooperation was particularly efficient: SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research). The UK was so nervous about it that they intended to raise the issue at the level of a NATO summit. But we demonstrated that EDA could successfully provide the interface between the military requirements and the EU structures in charge of that programme. I remember that Catherine Ashton came for a visit when a SESAR related meeting was also taking place in the building. She could hardly believe that we had in one of our meeting rooms all NATO nations, including the US and Turkey, as well as all EDA members, including Cyprus, SESAR Joint Undertaking and NATO International secretariat sitting at the same table.

N.Witney: This would have been totally impossible in my days! It shows how things have changed.

C.-F.Arnould: Another aspect of our relationship with NATO was the strong support we got from the US, especially the Pentagon. They were very supportive of what we were doing at EDA, especially in the field of air-to-air refuelling. It was important for them to show, including to the Congress, that Europeans were beginning to be serious about enhancing their capabilities and addressing their shortfalls.

J.Domecq: When I arrived, I immediately saw the need for a structured relationship with NATO, upstream, in the prioritisation domain. Today we work hand in hand on key tools such as CDP, NDPP and CARD and in many other domains. So, even before the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (in 2016), we had already gone ahead with closer cooperation. We avoid duplication in both senses. And, importantly, during my period, our Member States never blocked NATO from participating in a single meeting in EDA. Which, unfortunately, has not been the case the other way around. Looking ahead, transparency will be essential for a strong relationship.

And the relationship with the European Commission? How has it evolved over time?

C.-F.Arnould: Just before my appointment, relations were difficult, particularly in the context of the revision of the Joint Action (which was replaced in 2011 by a Council Decision). I remember a letter from the Commission that challenged some key EDA missions, especially related to competition, markets and the implementation of the two defence directives. But we found the proper formulation rather quickly, thanks to Michel Barnier and his cabinet.

Afterwards, the cooperation was excellent and easy on many issues. I already mentioned SESAR JU. I should add DG MOVE, DG Connect, and agencies such as EASA: on certification, for instance, which I regard as very important, our work was fully complementary. The main challenge was with DG Industry and Market: either you have theological quarrels on who should do what – community versus intergovernmental approach – or you concentrate on what is to be done and where it is best achieved. We did not always agree on everything but we knew that we really needed each other to be successful. And I was lucky enough to have great interlocutors both in the cabinets and the DGs.

J.Domecq: Today, EDA has working relations with 16 Directorates-General (DG) in the Commission. We also have reinforced our cooperation with its executive agencies, such as Frontex, the cyber agencies and many others. Something which would have been unthinkable some years ago. We’ve seen a complete change in Commission attitude towards defence: while not so long ago, there was a lot of reluctance and even dogmatism on their side not to touch anything related to defence, it now wants to get involved notably with the European Defence Fund. There is also talk of a DG Defence in the next Commission.


How to you assess these developments?

J.Domecq: I have nothing against a DG Defence to manage the big budget of the European Defence Fund. But we should not throw away the results of the test runs we did over the past three years. I mean the Pilot Project as well as the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) which is managed by EDA and is going very well; you only have to read the reports of the independent experts. Also, we should avoid mixing things up, and instead keep a clear line on who is doing what. Capability prioritisation and defence planning, for instance, is not something to be done by the Commission. And I don’t know any Member State who wants the Commission to take care of that. So, if the EDF intends to be more than a strong defence cooperation incentive, we might end up with a Fund which is not capability but industry driven. And I’m not sure this is what Member States want.

How do you see the future of the Agency?

C.-F.Arnould: EDA is well placed and equipped to play a key role in the field of joint capability development, for today and tomorrow. The design is outstanding. The combination of complementary tasks, complementary shareholders, the network of stakeholders, having an intergovernmental approach but supported by a lean and competent structure and part of the EU family, building on experts’ input but receiving guidance at the political level of Defence Ministers, these are tremendous assets for what is to be done. But Member States have to use EDA’s full potential now if they want it to be even more useful and efficient in the future. If we fail to use today’s momentum for defence cooperation, it will be very difficult for us to return to it again later.

J.Domecq: As said before, I think the future of the Agency is very much tied to PESCO and whether we can make concrete progress towards strategic autonomy. If we manage to do this, then I see EDA playing a very important role, especially for making the different EU defence initiatives work in a coherent manner. If we don’t get this right now, it will be a missed opportunity that might not come back anytime soon.