European defence, one achievement at a time

“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”

These words, arguably the most famous of the Schuman Declaration, inspired the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. Yet the road to European integration indeed turned out to be both bumpy and winding. Only two years on, for example, the French National Assembly rejected a treaty that would have established a European Defence Community (EDC). As it happens, the EDC plan had been envisioned by French diplomat Jean Monnet, one of the architects of the Schuman Declaration.

The failure of the EDC – through which six European countries would have created a supranational army – turned the spotlight towards NATO, which had been founded a few years earlier. In the decades that followed, European countries undertook several joint initiatives in the field of defence, but NATO’s umbrella overshadowed them all. At no point was this more glaringly obvious than during the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, which exposed the shortfalls of the European project in terms of security cooperation and military capabilities. The United States, whose global hegemony was at that time uncontested, stepped into the vacuum created by the EU’s inaction.

Wake-up call

Much like World War II, the Balkan wars were a wake-up call for Europe: it was plain to see that the poison of conflict was still corroding the continent. Thus, before the turn of the century, European defence cooperation received a renewed boost. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty opened the door to a common defence policy in the EU, and the 1998 British-French declaration of Saint-Malo decisively endorsed the Union’s capacity for autonomous action on the international stage. Ever since, defence integration has been a quiet success story of the EU.

To be sure, concrete achievements in the area of security and defence have come along at a more modest pace than Monnet envisioned – but they have come along nonetheless.

Creation of EDA

One such achievement was the European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003; another was the birth of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004. EDA was a brainchild of the Convention on the Future of Europe, which had been tasked with producing a draft Constitution for the EU.\

Although French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the prior establishment of EDA showed the way forward. The fiasco of the Constitutional Treaty was not to be interpreted as a blanket rejection and, therefore, many ideas put forward by the Convention ended up finding a new home in the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009.

The Lisbon Treaty enshrined EDA’s role as a cornerstone of the EU’s flourishing security and defence landscape. The Agency’s intergovernmental nature – EDA is subject to the authority of the Council – places it in an ideal position to act as a catalyst for joint capability-building initiatives involving Member States. All EU countries but one are members of EDA, which has also reached agreements with several non-EU countries (Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Ukraine). EDA allows countries to cooperate on an ad hoc basis, and provides them with invaluable expert input. Additionally, it represents a useful vehicle for Member States to liaise with key EU institutions, such as the European Commission.

In yet another breakthrough, the Lisbon Treaty offered the option of so-called ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ among Member States. Unfortunately, this became a neglected asset in the EU’s toolbox, as Europe entered an onerous decade marked by multiple crises.

Nevertheless, the EU once again ended up finding new momentum in the midst of the storm. Instead of allowing itself to be dragged down by the opponents of European integration, who convinced British voters to make the regrettable decision of leaving the bloc, the EU kept moving forward.

First, the European Security Strategy was replaced in 2016 by a more ambitious Global Strategy, which set the development of ‘strategic autonomy’ as a fundamental goal of the EU. As the Global Strategy puts it, “a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy.” All efforts in this direction have received the vital support of EDA – a critical lever in the EU’s quest to underpin its self-sufficiency in an increasingly volatile international environment.

Second, EDA finalised its Long Term Review (LTR) in 2017, thus answering the Global Strategy’s call for enhanced defence cooperation among EU Member States. The LTR refined and reinforced the Agency’s role as the central hub in terms of capability development and strategic planning in the EU. Since 2017, EDA has not only taken on new responsibilities, but its added value has also increased across the board.

Third, the ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, finally came into fruition. PESCO was established in December 2017 with the participation of the vast majority of EU Member States. While it cannot be expected to immediately put an end to today’s excessive military fragmentation, PESCO can kick-start a virtuous cycle leading to more robust and cohesive European defence capabilities.

It is important to underline that PESCO and NATO are fully compatible – actually, by tapping into synergies on a European scale, PESCO will reduce wasteful duplications and indirectly benefit other NATO allies. As European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said in 2017, EU countries combined spend half as much as the United States on defence, yet attain only 15 per cent of its military efficiency. A case in point is the fact that EU countries use 17 different types of tanks, while the United States uses only one.

EDA and PESCO: two sides of the same coin

The fortunes of PESCO and EDA are inextricably linked; indeed, they can be thought of as two sides of the same coin. That is true in an institutional sense (EDA is part of the PESCO Secretariat) and in a functional sense (many PESCO projects require EDA’s direct support). Moreover, both initiatives illustrate the EU’s new-found drive in defence integration, which has also led to the launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD).

Given the intricacies of this burgeoning framework, it is clear that EU Member States need to keep empowering EDA if PESCO is to realise its full potential.

The 15th anniversary of EDA is a cause for celebration, as well as a perfect occasion to reaffirm the Agency’s mission and insist on the need to streamline military spending in Europe. Current levels of fragmentation severely hinder the EU’s competitiveness and self-reliance, and are simply unsustainable. EU citizens appear to agree with this assessment, as polls show there is significant public appetite for further integration in the area of security and defence.

EDA is well suited to keep leading this historical process, and to consolidate itself as an epitome of the EU of the future: flexible, smart, and effective.