Let Ukraine build the missiles with EU money

EDM: Before Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, what was the level of industrial cooperation between Kyiv and European countries?

Mykhailo Samus: Before the conflict, there were initiatives to build industrial ties between Ukraine and Europe. For instance, France’s DCNS (now Naval Group) collaborated with Ukraine on the Corvette programme from 2007, sharing development with European countries such as Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. Companies like MBDA and Thales were involved, and it made for a substantial partnership. But this ended when the pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovich, took office and halted the programme in 2010. Other efforts included plans to modernise Ukraine’s Mi-24 helicopters with France’s Safran. While there was intent, sadly many projects failed to progress.

EDM: Since Russia’s invasion, has it become easier for Ukraine and Europe to collaborate on industrial projects?

Definitely. Cooperation has strengthened. Previously, Ukraine’s political instability, Europe’s defence budget cuts after the 2008 financial crisis, and competing defence priorities threw up all sorts of barriers. Some European countries even maintained defence exports to Russia.

Ukraine’s Administrative Arrangement with EDA in 2015 only got so far, as the Europe Union had a limited focus on Ukraine, compounded by fragmented defence markets. Ukraine was also seen as a competitor. At the time, Ukraine primarily exported arms to non-European markets, with around $1 billion annually.

EDM: So, what has changed?

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and especially since February 2022, the EU has embraced Ukraine as a partner and as an ally. If you look at Ukraine’s expertise in drone technology, that's proven invaluable. This year, Ukraine produced over a million drones — soon to be four million in a year — including thousands of long-range types used in strategic operations against Russian assets. Ukraine’s knowledge of electronic warfare, tested in real combat, is a valuable asset that it now shares with European partners.

Then there’s Ukraine’s tactical warning system, Delta. Delta enables real-time battlefield data sharing via a secure, cloud-based platform accessible to soldiers through Starlink or military internet setups. This innovation has reshaped battlefield awareness, and Ukraine is prepared to share this experience with European defence industries.

EDM: How would you describe the current collaboration between Ukraine and European countries?

The collaborative atmosphere has been incredibly productive. We’ve had two International Defence Industries Forums. With the second forum in 2024, building on last year’s inaugural event, you can see how it has moved from exploratory talk to real projects. European, Ukrainian, and North American producers have gathered, engaging in real discussions about overcoming specific challenges. For instance, the Kyiv General Staff is engaged in repair-and-maintenance programmes, focusing on battlefield-essential equipment such as Leopard tanks and Panzer Howitzers. Additionally, joint ventures for ammunition production are underway to meet Ukraine’s very pressing needs.

EDM: What specific outcomes do you expect from this collaboration? Will there be joint EU-Ukraine arms, or is this more about EU financing for Ukrainian production?

I'd say the Industries Forum initiative is clearly focused on production, combining EU resources with Ukrainian capabilities. You know, rather than facing delays in sourcing equipment, some European countries find it more effective to invest in Ukrainian facilities that can produce systems quickly. With funds from Denmark, a Ukrainian plant has swiftly produced 18 Ukrainian self-propelled Bohdana howitzers at a speed that European facilities have not been able to match. Similarly, Ukraine’s Stugna anti-tank missiles and Ukraine-made Neptune cruise missiles have proven to be truly cost-effective alternatives that can be produced locally with European investment. Maybe that’s a better way for Germany, say, to invest. Maybe it is less politically sensitive than sending German Taurus missiles to Ukraine. I really believe more opportunities lie in joint ventures producing European-designed equipment within Ukraine. When it comes to the urgent need for maintenance and repair, Rheinmetall is already establishing projects in Ukraine, making repair logistics faster and more practical.

EDM: Trust is always an issue in sensitive defence investments. Ukraine has also scored poorly in corruption perception rankings in the past. Does corruption factor into European partners’ concerns?

Trust is indeed a factor, though a bigger issue is in fact the raw material shortages for ammunition production. Many nations are ramping up production, which has strained global supply chains. Both Europe and Ukraine need reliable access to critical materials, as production facilities often face bottlenecks due to these shortages. Concerns about corruption were actually absent at the last industry forum. Ukraine’s defence industry has become more transparent, and when you are dealing directly on a company-to-company basis, you not relying solely on government channels. I think this approach has fostered trust and helped coordination. What’s more, Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation has introduced the collaborative platform Brave1, reducing bureaucratic obstacles in procurement. Challenges do remain, especially with annual budget approvals that can delay domestic contracts, but I’d say that these impact foreign partnerships much less.

EDM: Do you expect an impact from incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s more protectionist agenda?

I think it will be even more important to develop cooperation between European and Ukrainian defence industries, given possibly negative developments stemming from new U.S. policies.

EDM: Finally, do you think there should be Ukrainian ties to EDA?

Absolutely.EDA and European defence would benefit. The Agency typically focuses on long-term projects, while Ukraine’s needs, for a country at war, are immediate, especially in areas like drones and electronic warfare. So the battlefield in Ukraine serves as a testing ground for defence innovations, necessitating constant adaptation to counter electronic interference.

One example is how Ukraine has developed cheap, First Person View (FPV) drones with a video feed, built from scratch. Ukrainian forces adapt these drones’ communication frequencies on a daily basis to counter Russian jamming. Another example is that Ukrainian engineers created a kind of FPV fighter drone to combat high-altitude reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Ukranian naval drones have completely changed the nature of naval combat. I am sure that these military systems can be very interesting for the EU defence industry.

So what’s to stop the EU proposing that Ukrainian defence experts share knowledge at EDA? I don’t think it is too much to ask. This collaboration would help European partners keep up to date on technological advances on the front line, as well as deepening our strategic relationship as Ukraine progresses towards EU membership.