EDA steps up as intergovernmental nexus of defence at EU level

In May, the European Union’s 27 Ministers of Defence approved the European Defence Agency’s 2024 Long-Term Review (LTR). A binding policy document for EDA, the LTR lays out responsibilities for the Agency, with a stronger focus on supporting Member States through the full development cycle of military capabilities. EDA now has five core tasks, rising from the three outlined in the previous, 2017 LTR. This time, aggregating demand towards joint procurement and defence innovation come into greater focus. 

When writing a mission statement, one starting point for inspiration might be U.S. professor Michael Porter’s quote: “The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do”. For the European Defence Agency, however, that was taken care of during its establishment almost 20 years ago, and in its legal basis, the ‘Council Decision’ of October 2015. EDA is neither an intelligence-gathering agency nor does it not conduct military operations. It is far from being a kind of EU Ministry of Defence.

For years, it was enough to have the three tasks of being: 1) the main intergovernmental tool at EU level for deciding capability priorities; 2) the preferred defence cooperation forum, giving management support at EU level; 3) the bridge between Member States and wider EU policies.

But a new impetus in defence collaboration since 2017 with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), as well as other initiatives, already meant EDA was playing a greater role than in the past, with its advice sought by EU institutions and taking on more project management both as part of the PESCO secretariat and in the EDF.

“Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine accelerated that dynamic,” says Etienne de Durand, who is EDA’s de-facto chief of staff and led the LTR reform negotiations with Member States.  “We were being asked to be even more ambitious in our work, given the geopolitical context,” de Durand says. “But it was also important for EDA to set out what we can, and cannot do, even with the broader mandate we have now. The LTR is both a mission statement and an identity statement,” he explains.

With a letter sent to Member States in December 2023 from EDA’s Head of Agency Josep Borrell, so began the intense process of steering the review by de Durand and his team, the Chief Executive’s Policy Office. This time, EDA did not have the luxury of taking a year to consider its path forward by circulating long, thoughtful papers, as it did in 2016 for the previous LTR.

‘No brainer’

However, Member States were ready to reinforce the Agency. EDA had recently shown its worth by penning the 2023 revision of the EU Capability Development Priorities, agreed by Member States, to reflect the full spectrum of military potential and to serve as a key reference for EU initiatives. The success of setting up a 155mm ammunition procurement scheme in record time was in the Agency’s favour, not to mention the new Hub for European Defence Innovation (HEDI).

“Building on the Agency’s recent achievements, one of the questions we asked Member States was: what future role do you envisage for EDA in the aggregation of demand and joint procurement, as well as in defence innovation?” de Durand says.

Innovation, he asserts, was a clear marker for the new LTR. “We were struck by the fact that there is a lot of research and development going across EDA and the European Commission, with some real successes, and somehow that was not fully reflected in the 2017 LTR,” he adds. So LTR 2024 core task number two was added: ‘Enabling collaborative defence research, technology, and innovation’. “It was, frankly speaking, a no brainer,” de Durand says.

Core task number four, ‘Aggregating demand towards joint procurement’, was less straightforward because some Member States were keen for EDA to become a full-blown procurement agency, while others were less so. “Again, we tried to be realistic about what we can and cannot do,” de Durand says. “We’ve arrived at a good compromise. We signal that we can handle procurement tasks, though not all the time, as we are not primarily a procurement agency. We can aggregate demand more effectively from Member States so that industry is not dealing with multiple, competing orders for equipment,” de Durand says.

Clarity and visibility in anniversary year

The 2024 Long-Term Review makes clear too that EDA will need, now more than ever, to act as a facilitator, voicing national defence ministries joint positions in EU civilian and defence policies. In effect, defence expertise is always needed to inform civilian policies that impact defence, from the Single European Sky initiative to the regulation of chemicals, known as REACH.  Given the flurry of EU security and defence initiatives in the past 6 years or so, it is now essential to ensure, through EDA, a strong intergovernmental voice is reflected here as well.

Coordination with NATO has also been newly stressed.

For de Durand and his team, in EDA’s 20th anniversary year, the Long-Term Review sets out not just the higher level of ambition of the Agency but gives greater clarity and visibility to what the agency does, including the specifics. After all, EDA is uniquely placed in the EU institutional landscape, working for and financed by Member States yet deeply embedded in the Brussels ecosystem. EDA is involved, for example, in all dimensions of developing the military capabilities that EU governments need. Being small, the Agency also knows where it can be most useful.

“We are not claiming at EDA that we can do the whole cycle of defence capability development, from ideation to procurement,” de Durand says. “We are not saying: ‘here’s a new fighter plane or here’s a tank’. We are saying to Member States that we are agile, eager to help launch your concrete capability projects, and that we are here to support you every step of the way.”

DEFENCE NEXUS

1. Identifying shared needs and priorities at EU level to ensure that EU Member States’ armed forces have the capabilities they actually require
2. Enabling collaborative defence research, technology, and innovation, to prepare the future of EU defence
3. Harmonising requirements and engaging in joint capability development, while ensuring interoperability
4. Aggregating demand towards joint procurement, to fill capabilities shortfalls
5. Interfacing with EU civilian and defence policies, voicing Ministries of Defence’s joint positions