A full house
Cont is also clear about what constitutes really working together. “If you’re thinking about collaboration in the short term,” he says, “you can just reduce it to joint procurement – buying the same product together.”
But real cooperation, he argues, is more like building a house together, requiring joint planning, aligned objectives, and a shared sense of purpose that persists over time.
That is clear in the need for a cohesive missile defence architecture in Europe. If realised, EDA would not merely support Member States’ one-off projects, but could “achieve a structure capable of addressing bigger problems, to foster projects
of real significance,” Cont says.
Achieving this European vision, however, will require joint planning, a coordination of both timing and financial commitment among Member States.
And this is where cooperation often stalls. Countries operate on different timetables and financial constraints. The new CFM mechanism could help. (See EDM page 29).
As Cont puts it: “It’s like a group of friends planning a trip – if one wants to travel in August and the other in February, it’s not going to work.” Continuity between governments and policies is also critical for any coherent
strategy. “For defence capabilities, there can’t be gaps. You can’t have an air force that stops functioning for five years and then trying to buy it new aircraft,” Cont says.
Ultimately, cooperation could help European Union defence better reflect the bloc’s economic weight. “The EU’s defence budget is one-third of the United States, but do we have one-third of American capabilities? If the answer is yes,
then EDA can close tomorrow because we will have reached our goal.”
For the full CARD report, please go to: eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives
The EU’s defence review 2024 finds that:
- Defence spending is rising, projected to have increased by more than 30% in 2024, but that this alone will not be enough to prepare the EU for high-intensity warfare.
- EU countries need to simultaneously address
short-term operational needs and long-term strategic priorities by investing in technology while ensuring sufficient production of reliable systems for sustained, high-intensity operations while maintaining long-term planning.
- EU countries will need
to prioritise investment in land, air, and maritime capabilities for high-intensity warfare. Key areas include replenishing stockpiles, modernising defence systems, and enhancing cybersecurity, interoperability, and strategic enablers like satellite
communication.
- The EU needs to collaborate in defence procurement and research to bolster the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), not always purchasing abroad.
- Ministries of Defence will need to better align their national
defence plans with EU and NATO priorities, and use EU frameworks such as PESCO and the collaborative opportunities. This would enhance efficiency, foster innovation, and ensure the EU’s strategic readiness for crises.